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THE EXPORT OF CULTURAL PROPERTY AND
UNITED STATES POLICY
Craig M. Bargher-
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States, unlike most nations, has almost no restrictions on the ex-
port of cultural property, and imposes no duty on cultural property imports.'
Legislation protects archeological sites and national monuments in the United
States,2 and restricts the sale and alteration of significant cultural property creat-
ed by U.S. artists and artisans, which is owned by the federal government.' De-
spite its own lack of protectionist legislation, the United States respects other
nations' cultural property laws, and cooperates with other nations seeking the
return of illegally removed cultural property.4 This lack of cultural property ex-
port controls arguably drains the United States of objects and works which are an
important part of its cultural heritage and identity. This Article addresses the
issue whether legislation should be adopted in the United States restricting the
export of its cultural property.
Part II of this Article first discusses various definitions of cultural property
and adopts a very broad definition. This broad definition recognizes that art and
cultural objects consist not merely of paintings and sculptures, but of virtually all
manifestations of creativity. Part II also examines two contrasting perspectives on
cultural property and human existence: cultural internationalism and cultural
* Craig M. Bargher is a 1990 graduate of Brown University with an A.B. in History and Public
Policy, and received his J.D. in 1993 from DePaul University College of Law. He is an associate
with Shannon Law Offices, Ltd., in Chicago. Craig thanks Professor Patty Gerstenblith of DePaul's
College of Law for her guidance on this Comment.
1. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the hiternational Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275,
314 (1982) ("Today, almost every country in the world restricts and regulates the export of cultural
property; the outstanding exception is the United States of America."). Other countries lacking cultur-
al property export laws and regulation include Denmark, Uganda, Singapore, and Togo. Id. at 314
n.71; see also FRANKLIN FELDMAN & STEPHEN E. WEIL ART WORKS: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE 527
(1974) ("The United States has followed a laissez faire policy with respect to the importation and
exportation of works of art.").
2. Lisa Marie Rafanelli, Comment, A Comparative Study of Cultural Property Import Regula-
tion: The United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, 15 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 543, 553
(1991) (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-450, 461-468, 470 (1988) (providing protection for national mon-
uments and giving the President the discretion to proclaim certain entities as national monuments)).
3. James J. Fishman & Susan Metzger, Protecting America's Cultural and Historical Patrimony,
4 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 57, 65 (1976) (citing Exec. Order No. 11,593, 3 C.F.R. 154, 155-56
(1971)).
4. See John Henry Merryman, The Retention of Cultural Property, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477,
480 (1988) (stating that the United States has had the most generous response of a market nations to
source nations' efforts to protect their cultural property).
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nationalism. In addition, it considers two fundamental goals in cultural property
policy: the property's retention and its preservation. Part II next discusses the
United States' general export laws and policies. A brief study of U.S. export
laws shows that Congress intends to encourage free exports and free trade, and
that traditional export controls arose from a desire to protect the United States'
global power. In addition, Part II examines existing schemes in the United States
to protect its cultural property. Finally, Part II explores the advantages and disad-
vantages of limiting cultural property exports. Part III analyzes the concept of an
American cultural heritage, and argues that any plan to restrict the export of
cultural property in this country must be flexible.
II. BACKGROUND
A. DEFINITIONS OF "CULTURAL PROPERTY"
Any discussion about regulating the trade of cultural property must begin with
a definition. Commentators and international conventions present a broad contin-
uum of what "cultural property" entails, ranging from paintings and sculptures to
folklore. A comprehensive analysis of the definitional approaches is beyond the
scope of this Article. What follows is a brief exploration of the various defini-
tions, to provide a foundation for an analysis of the United States' policy on the
subject.
The definition of cultural property the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization Convention of 1970 ("UNESCO") provided has been
called one of the most universally accepted approaches.5 It is broad, including
rare collections of fauna, flora, minerals, and anatomy; property relating to histo-
ry; artifacts from archaeological excavations; antiquities; rare manuscripts; post-
age; archives; furniture; and musical instruments.6 Thus, the definition encom-
5. See C. Franklin Sayre, Comment, Cultural Property Laws in India and Japan, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 851, 851 n.1 (1986) (providing the UNESCO definition) (citing Article 1 of the UNESCO Con-
vention on the Means of Prohibiting the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property, UNESCO Doc. SHC/MD/5 (1970) [hereinafter cited as UNESCO], reprinted in S. Wil-
liams, THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROTECTION OF MOVABLE CULTURAL PROPERTY, A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 224 (1978)).
6. Article I of UNESCO states:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "cultural property" means property which,
on religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of impor-
tance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science and which belongs to
the following categories:
(a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, and objects of
palaeontological interest; (b) property relating to history, including the history of science
and technology and military and social history, to the life of national leaders, thinkers, sci-
entists and artists and to events of national importance; (c) products of archaeological
excavations (including regular and clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries; (d) ele-
ments of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological sites which have been dismnem-
bered: (e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins and en-
graved seals; (f objects of ethnological interest; (g) property of artistic interest, such as:
[Vol. IV: 189
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passes not only human-made objects and manifestations of human creativity, but
also objects found in nature which humans have collected and classified.
At least one commentator has argued for the inclusion of something less
tangible than objects and artifacts in the definition; such as folklore." That com-
mentator suggests an expanded definition, one giving "more weight to tribal,
ethnic, and regional groups, their informal, intangible expressions as well as
concrete creations and their own culturally-defined approach to enshrining and
exploiting nature and cultural values thereof."' However, the inclusion of folk-
lore in the definition of cultural property is more valuable to discussing the
awareness of different types of human expression as cultural property than it is
to discussing export policies.
A few countries, such as Japan and India, enacted specific legislation to pro-
tect their cultural property. Japan's definition is much broader and more detailed
than UNESCO's definition, dividing cultural property into four main groups:
tangible property, intangible property, folk culture, and monuments.9 Although
Japan's Cultural Property Protection Law (CPPL) wields an almost all-encom-
passing definition, an object must meet strict requirements before it is considered
valuable enough to be protected under the law.'0 Only a select group of works
satisfies the criteria." Comparatively, India's cultural property legislation pro-
vides a broad, less detailed description of cultural property than the CPPL's
description. India's legislation divides cultural property into two main groups:
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by hand on any support and in any
material (excluding industrial designs and manufactured articles decorated by hand); (ii)
original works of statuary art and sculpture in any material; (iii) original engravings, prints
and lithographs; (iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any material;
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula ["[W]ork[s] of art or human industry of an early
epoch." 1146 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L Dicr. (1981)], old books, documents and
publications of special interest (historical, artistic, scientific, literary, etc.) singly or in
collections; (i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections; (j) archives,
including sound, photographic and cinematographic archives; (k) articles of furniture more
than one hundred years old and old musical instruments.
UNESCO, supra note 6. Each nation who signed the terms of the convention had the power to re-
strict the definition's scope. Sayre, Comment, supra note 6, at 851-52 n.l.
7. Communications and Culture: Should the United States Protect Cultural Resources? 80 (Oct.
28, 1991) (unpublished transcript of a forum cosponsored by the National Endowment for the Arts
and the Annenberg Washington Program, on file with the Annenberg Washington Program, North-
western University) (discussion including Nicholas R. Spitzer, Folklorist and Research Associate,
Smithsonian Institution).
8. Id. at 81-82.
9. Sayre, Comment, supra note 5, at 862 & n.38 (citing Bunkazai Hogo Ho (Cultural Property
Protection Law) No. 214 of May 30, 1950 (revised 1954 and 1975) [heteinafter cited as CPPL]). The
definition is too lengthy to be reproduced in this Comment. For a discussion of the CPPL, see Sayre,
Comment, supra note 5, at 862-68.
10. Sayre, Comment, supra note 5, at 863; see Bator, supra note 1, at 321 ("In Japan highly
important cultural property is 'designated' (i.e.. registered) and, once so designated, may not be ex-
ported. The total number of designated objects and monuments was recently estimated to be under
10.000.").
1I. Sayre. Comment, supra note 5, at 863.
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ancient monuments and antiquities."2
Thus, numerous definitions exist, and different nations choose descriptions of
cultural property which reflect the types of objects and works they wish to pro-
tect. While the various combinations of definitions may be inherently interesting
and deserving of a more rigorous discussion, this Article will focus mainly on
why the United States treats the export of cultural property the way it does, and
how that treatment reflects the United States' role in the global market.
B. PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE
One commentator described two distinct approaches to thinking about cultural
property."3 These approaches are basically two points of view for evaluating
ownership rights and trade regulations of cultural property.
1. Global Human Experience and Cultural Internationalism
Cultural property can be part of global human experience, regardless of its
origin or current ownership, "independent of property rights or national jurisdic-
tion."'4 The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict of May 14, 1954 (Hague 1954) embodied this concept of cultur-
al internationalism." Hague 1954 stated a rationale for the international protec-
tion of cultural property:
'Being convinced that damage to cultural property belonging to any people
whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each
people makes its contribution to the culture of the world .... Considering that
the preservation of the cultural heritage is of great importance for all peoples of
the world and that it is important that this heritage should receive international
protection .... '
Hague 1954 derived from the Lieber Code, written by a Columbia professor to
establish a code of conduct during the American Civil War. 7 Article 35 of the
Lieber Code states that cultural property shall be protected from all avoidable
injury, even during military attack.
In a different but related argument, one commentator has suggested abolishing
the concept of cultural property altogether." By labeling cultural objects as
12. See Sayre. Comment. supra note 5. at 871-79 (discussing the Ancient Monuments and Ar-
chaeological Sites and Remains Act (No. 24 of 1958) [hereinafter cited as AMASR] and AMASR's
failure).
13. For purposes of discussion, this Comment will adopt UNESCO's broad definition of cultural
property.
14. John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT'L L.
831, 831 (1986).
15. Id. at 832 (citing 249 U.N.T.S. 240).
16. Id. at 836-37.
17. General Order No. 100, April 24, 1863.
18. Communications and Culture. supra note 7, at 73-79 (statement from Clemency Chase
Coggins, Adjunct Professor, Department of Archaeology, Boston University).
Should the United States protect the cultural resources it is pleased to consider its prop-
[Vol. IV: 189
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property they become commodities, subject to the market, which is where that
commentator believes cultural objects do not belong.'
2. Cultural Nationalism
In contrast, cultural property may be viewed as a part of a nation's cultural
heritage.' This perspective allows national ownership and protection of objects
considered cultural property, and therefore sanctions the use of cultural property
export controls.2' For purposes of analyzing the nationalistic perspective, one
commentator suggests two categories: source nations and market nations. A
source nations' supply of marketable cultural property exceeds the internal de-
mand for it.' These nations have more cultural objects and works of art than
they can sell locally. Countries such as Mexico, Egypt, Greece, and India are
source nations. 3 In contrast, in market nations the demand for cultural property
exceeds the supply.24 Market nations include France, Germany, Japan, the Scan-
dinavian nations, Switzerland, and the United States.' Usually, a market
nations' market demands encourage source nations to export cultural property.26
However, most source nations place strict regulations on the export of cultural
property.2
Strict regulation of the export of cultural property often reflects what has been
labeled "cultural nationalism"28 or "cultural heritage."29 Some countries prohib-
it the export of cultural property because it is part of the country's national heri-
tage or identity. National heritage includes all cultural property within a
country's borders that is subject to the country's jurisdiction or power." How-
ever, countries do not always limit the definition of their national heritage to
cultural property produced by that country's citizens or found within that
erty? No. It should formulate policy that will strive before all to maintain cultural integ-
rity, ancient and modem. Then the United States should think about how to prevent this
cultural tapestry from becoming a separable cultural resource.
Communications and Culture. supra note 7, at 76 (Clemency Chase Coggins).
19. See John Moustakas, Comment. Group Rights in Cultural Property: Justifing Strict In-
alienability 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1179, 1184 (1989) ("The nexus between a cultural object and a
group is the essential measurement for determining whether group rights in cultural property will be
effectuated to the fullest extent possible - by holding such objects strictly inalienable from the
group.").
20. Merryman, supra note 14, at 832.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. E.g., Merryman, supra note 4, at 489.
29. E.g., Brian A. Yapko, Comment, Evolution of American Attitudes and Laws Regarding Ethnic
Art and Artifacts: From Cultural Imperialism to Cultural Phralisn, 9 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
621, 623 (1987).
30. Bator, supra note I, at 303.
1994]
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country's borders.3 A famous example of one nation's claiming to absorb the
cultural property of another nation is the case of the Elgin Marbles. Removed
from Greece by Lord Elgin of England, these Parthenon sculptures became, in
England's opinion, part of England's national heritage. 2 Greece, of course, dis-
putes the idea and consistently attempts to reclaim the Elgin Marbles as part of
its own cultural heritage.
For proponents of cultural nationalism, the removal of the cultural property is
tantamount to a crime against history. In fact, cultural nationalism can reach the
level of pathos; "symbolically ris[ing] to the level of a crime against history,
against knowledge and against civilization itself."33 John Henry Merryman, the
dominant commentator in the field of cultural property, explained that the origin
of cultural nationalism derived mainly from what he calls Byronism.34 The Eng-
lish romantic poet George Gordon, Lord Byron, denounced Lord Elgin's removal
of the Greek Parthenon sculptures, the "Elgin Marbles," from Greece. Byron at-
tacked Lord Elgin in his poem The Curse of Minerva, and sought to protect
England from the blame, insisting Lord Elgin was Scottish, not English.33 The
poem's premise, that the marbles were Greek and belonged in Greece, reflects
cultural nationalism, which has gained a solid foundation in Western attitudes. 6
Cultural nationalism, at its extreme, exudes a belief that a cultural object's
presence in the country is necessary to maintain the nation's welfare and identi-
ty.37 In the case of the Afo-A-Kom statue which belonged to a tribe in Cam-
eroon and appeared on the New York art market, the importance of cultural
property importance transcends nationalism. According to the tribe, the statue's
31. Id.
32. E.g., Id. Greece, of course, still claims the Elgin marbles as its property. 'They are the symbol
and the blood and the soul of the Greek people .... We have fought and died for the Parthenon and
the Acropolis .. . .' John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CAL. L.
REv. 339, 349-50 (1989) (quoting Melina Mercouri, Greek Minister of Culture, speaking of the Elgin
Marbles).
33. Id. Nazism, of course, provides one of the clearest examples of extreme nationalism. '[W]e
believe and we know that the German everywhere is a German - whether he lives in the Reich, or in
Japan, in France or in China, or anywhere else in the world. Not countries or continents, not climate
or the environment, but blood and race determine the world of ideas of the German.' Merryman.
supra note 4, at 491 (quoting Rudolph Hess).
34. E.g., Merryman, supra note 4, at 493.
35. He wrote:
Frown not on England; England owns him not;
Athena, no! thy plunderer was a Scot.
And well I know within that bastard land
Hath Wisdom's goddess never held command;
A barren soil, where Nature's germs, confined
To stem sterility, can stint the mind;
A land of meanness, sophistry and mist.
Each breeze from foggy mount and marshy plain
Dilutes with drivel every drizzly brain ....
Merryman, supra note 4, at 493-94 n.52 (quoting Lord Byron, The Curse of Minerva).
36. Merryman, supra note 4, at 493.
37. See Merryman, supra note 4, at 496.
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physical presence in Cameroon is "necessary to the religious, ceremonial, and
communal life of the Kom" tribe.3" Merryman distinguished the religious argu-
ment from nationalistic ones. He suggested that two criteria apply to whether an
object's presence in its original place is absolutely required. First, the group or
culture which created the object must still exist.39 Second, the object must be
used actively for the religious or commercial purposes which were intended.4"
The difference between the religious stance and a purely nationalistic stance
pivots on when the cultural object is considered truly lost. If a non-religious
sculpture by an American artist, universally labelled as significant to American
culture, is removed from the United States, it is "lost." It is lost because it was
removed from its place of origin. However, it is not completely lost because it
exists in another place. Americans still know that it is an American object and, at
the very least, they can see it and study it in photographs.
However, the concept of loss can be different in the religious context. An
important religious object removed from its place of origin is lost in one of the
same ways that the American sculpture was lost in that it is physically removed,
but the religious object's removal also may be considered tantamount to its de-
struction, because it may be necessary for the religion's practice.
C. RETENTION AND PRESERVATION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
Two fundamental goals in cultural property policy are retention and preserva-
tion. While the former may lead to the latter, that is not always the case. As this
section discusses, the two goals are best understood as separate and distinct
concepts. If a nation retains objects it considers part of its national heritage,
those objects are not guaranteed preservation.
1. Retention
Most countries attempt to retain their cultural property.4 They employ sever-
al different retention plans, including expropriation laws which declare that cer-
tain cultural objects are state property; embargo laws which prohibit the export
of cultural property; and preemption laws which give the country a preemptive
right to buy cultural property offered for export. 2 Some nations require licenses
before allowing the export of cultural property.43 Some of the legislation mixes
the varying approaches, strictly forbidding the export of some property, while
allowing the export of others with almost no regulation.' All of the laws, de-
spite their degree of severity, are forms of export control and have been labelled
38. Id.
39. Id. at 497.
40. Id. at 477.
41. The United States is among the few countries that do not.
42. Id. at 477-78.
43. Bator, supra note 1, at 286.
44. Merryman, supra note 4, at 478.
1994]
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as retention schemes.45
Often, the most restrictive retention schemes arise in source nations - those
containing large amounts of cultural property." Such nations are usually poor
and in need of foreign trade.47 There is a high demand in the art market for
source nations' cultural property, yet they employ extensive export control poli-
cies on such property." In contrast, source nations usually encourage exports of
other goods, to stimulate their economic growth. While extensive retention
schemes may appear counterintuitive, cultural property is a different type of
commodity than coffee or steel; it often engenders a nation's identity and stimu-
lates artistic and intellectual growth.49
One argument in favor of retention schemes is that source nations who use
them do so because they care about the cultural property and therefore will pre-
serve the objects. Unfortunately, however, many art-rich countries simply cannot
afford to take care of all of their cultural property." Thus, retention does not
guarantee preservation.
2. Preservation
One commentator has noted that the values of integrity and visibility are in-
volved in the preservation of cultural objects.5 The trade of cultural objects can
contribute to their destruction or mutilation and thus ruin the object's integrity.52
Mutilation and the ruin of an object's integrity can occur when pieces of an
object are removed (sometimes stolen) and sold on the market. This happens
most often with statues and monuments.53 A famous case involving mosaics
which were removed from a Greek-Orthodox church in Cyprus and ultimately
ended up in the art market exemplifies the tragedy that can occur when cultural
objects are sold on the art market.' The mosaics were made of tiles of colored
glass, and "depicted Jesus Christ as a young boy in the lap of his mother, the
Virgin Mary, who was seated on a throne. Jesus and Mary were attended by two
archangels and surrounded by a frieze depicting the twelve apostles."5 Not only
were the mosaics stolen from their original context, but curved tiles were flat-
tened for easier display. 6 This flattening permanently altered the original effect
45. Id. "Scheme" is not used in the pejorative sense.
46. Id. at 479. See supra notes 21-35 and accompanying text (discussing source nations and cul-
tural nationalism).
47. Id. at 832.
48. Id. at 479.
49. See infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text (discussing cultural heritage).
50. Bator, supra note I, at 298.
51. Id. at 295.
52. Id. at 296.
53. Id.
54. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.,
917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
55. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church, 917 F.2d at 279.
56. Presentation by Cap Sease, curator at the Field Museum of Natural History, Chicago. Illinois.
Feb. 8, 1993.
[Vol. IV: 189
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that light had on the tiles, thus destroying their integrity.57
The aesthetic value of a cultural object, however, may be destroyed without
actual physical mutilation.58 Sometimes separating the individual components of
a series of cultural objects is as destructive as physical alteration.
Leaving an object in its context may be essential to academic study as well.59
In the field of archeology, documentation of an object's context is vital. If an
artifact's origin is unknown, it cannot be studied.'
The cultural property goals of accessibility and visibility are closely related to
preservation as well.6' Preservation of the cultural object is essential to these
goals, but does not guarantee them. Public display of cultural objects for the sake
of public accessibility and visibilty, may, ironically, harm them. An example is
illuminated manuscripts, which are damaged by prolonged exposure to light.6"
D. UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROL LAWS AND POLICIES
Before moving on to a discussion of export regulation of cultural property, a
basic understanding of the United States' export control laws is essential. There
is no general right to export in the United States.63 Most commodities origi-
nating in the United States cannot be exported unless the exporter obtains a
license from the Department of Commerce's Office of Export Licensing of the
Bureau of Export Administration (BXA).64 Other agencies control other export
products.65
The Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate exports.' Congress creat-
ed the most significant export legislation in response to the Soviet Union's in-
creased power after World War H."67 Before World War II, the Neutrality Laws
of 1935" provided for export controls, but only on weapons.69 After World
57. Id.
58. Bator. supra note 1, at 298.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 301.
61. Id. at 299.
62. Bator, supra note 1, at 300.
63. Dineen Ann Riviezzo, Note, An Iron Curtain to Free Trade: An Evaluation of H.R. 4653, tire
Export Administration Act Amendments, 22 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 857, 859 (1991). The Supreme
Court in Butterfield v. Stranahan upheld an import statute, but found that 'no individual has a right to
trade with foreign nations.' Id. at 859 n.6 (citing BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS: IMPROVING THE HAPHAZARD U.S. LEGAL REGIME 63, 64 n.5 (1988) (citing Butterfield v.
Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470. 493 (1904))).
64. CARTER, supra note 63 at 64 n.5. The licensing requirements are pursuant to the Export Ad-
ministration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 768-99 (1990).
65. For example the Food and Drug Administration regulates the export of pharmaceutical prod-
ucts. while the Department of State controls the export of arms, aircraft, munitions and naval equip-
ment throught the Office of Defense Trade Controls.
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have the power... [to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations.").
67. E.g., Peter S. Malloy, Note, Controls on the Export of Militarily Sensitive Technology: Na-
tional Security hnperative or U.S. hdustry Impediment? 18 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 841,
841 (1992).
68. Ch. 837, 49 Stat. 1081, repealed by the Neutrality Act of 1939, ch. 2, § 1, 54 Stat. 4.
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War II, Congress passed the Export Administration Act of 1949 (1949 EAA)70 ,
-which reflected the United States' new found international power and rejection of
its own isolationism. The Act formed the U.S. export regulation system's basic
structure, which endures today." Congress gave the President unchecked power
under the 1949 EAA. It believed that the executive branch "could best create a
'liberal international economic order' by channeling exports to Western Europe
while containing communism to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe by de-
nying vital goods and technologies from entering that region."7 The President
could forbid the export of not just weapons, but any commodities, to communist
countries that posed a threat to U.S. 'strategic, technological, and military supe-
riority and domestic stability.'
7 3
Thus, general U.S. export legislation arose from the narrow purpose of pro-
tecting American global power and preventing the spread of Communism. Since
the 1949 EAA Congress has repeatedly, through amendatory legislation, attempt-
ed to limit the President's power over export control, and to encourage free
trade.74 However, the Executive branch has frequently disregarded the increas-
ingly stringent standards Congress has placed on it.73 The Carter Administration,
for example, used export controls to implement human rights foreign policy. 76
The next section discusses existing legislation which protects American cul-
tural property, without preventing its export.
69. Gernot Stenger, Tie Development of American Export Control Legislation After World War
II. 6 Wis. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (1987).
70. Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7, at 50 U.S.C. App. §§2021 et seq. (1991).
71. Riviezzo, Note, supra note 63, at 863.
72. Id. at 862-63. Congress gave the President unfettered power under the Act because it believed
the United States held nearly invincible economic and military power after World War II. Stenger,
supra note 69, at 6.
73. Riviezzo, Note, supra note 63, at 863; Stenger, supra note 69, at 3.
74. Export Administration Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401 et seq. (1991) (limits the
President's discretion in preventing exports to communist nations); Equal Export Opportunity Act of
1972, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401 et seq. (1991) (requires the President to consider the effectiveness of export
bans and possible damage incurred by American competitors because of ineffective bans); Export
Administration Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1552 (1974); Export Administration Amendments of
1977, § 106, 91 Stat. 235 (1977) (President may control exports only upon demonstration that the ab-
sence of controls would harm national security interests; legislative veto created for agricultural ex-
ports); Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2420 (1991) (regulates the export
of "dual use" items, items which have both commercial and military application; regulates the export
of technology and know how related to dual use items); Export Administration Act of 1981, 50
U.S.C. App. §§ 2401 et seq. (1991); Export Administration Act of 1985, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401 et
seq. (1991) (extends the 1979 Act while placing more limitations on the President's power in four ar-
eas: agricultural embargoes, foreign policy, contract sanctity, and extraterritoriality); Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401 et seq. (1991). (further frees manufactur-
ers from the constraints of overly restrictive export laws).
75. Riviezzo, Note, supra note 63, at 864.
76. Carter, supra note 64; Clyde H. Famsworth, Issue and Debate, U.S. Grain and the Russian,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1981, at D1. In 1980 President Carter instituted an agricultural embargo against
the Soviet Union in reaction to the Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan.
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E. PROTECTION OF THE UNITED STATES' CULTURAL HERITAGE AND IDENTITY
1. The United States' Cultural Heritage and Identity
Before legislation protecting the United States' cultural property could be
enacted, the nation's cultural heritage had to be identified. Identifying a nation's
cultural heritage is important for several reasons.77 Cultural heritage provides
economic benefits by creating tourism, stimulating scholarship, and building
upon a nation's intellectual discourse.78 What belongs to a nation as a part of its
cultural heritage is a subjective question, and this subjectivity spawns conflict
among nations competing for ownership of cultural objects. 9 "Historically, art-
producing and art-amassing nations have given attention to maintaining or recov-
ering the artistic products of their own cultures as well as the imported aesthetic
treasures residing in domestic collections, primarily during wartime."8 Although
many nations focus on retaining cultural heritage, at the same time much of cul-
tural property is a commodity subject to market competition." Because of the
conflicts resulting from subjective definitions and cultural property market be-
havior, arguably the protection of a nation's cultural heritage (however defined)
depends on the nation's socio-economic conditions and its international political
power. 2
The evolution of American concepts of the United States' cultural heritage
and subsequent legislative attempts to protect it must be understood in the con-
text of American ethnocentrism. 3 To colonial America, the origin of the Ameri-
can Indians was unknown." Attempts to explain it began with the Bible. Chris-
tian Americans 'knew' that the Indian had to be descended from Noah and his
sons, because the rest of humankind had been drowned in the Flood.""5 But, the
first explorers of America could not establish a connection between the two, and
therefore hypothesized that the Indian was not human. 6 Other theories ex-
plained that the American Indians originated with the Lost Ten Tribes of Israel,
wayward Vikings, or Atlantis. Considering this mindset, Colonial America had
77. Some argue against the notion that art or cultural property belongs to any particular nation,
but rather that such property belongs to everyone. For a discussion of cultural internationalism, see
supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
78. Fishman & Metzger, supra note 3, at 58-59.
79. Mary McKenna, Comment, Problematic Provenance: Toward a Coherent United States Poli-
cy on the International Trade in Cultural Property, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 83, 92 (1991).
80. Id. (citing Nafziger, International Penal Aspects of Protecting Cultural Property, 19 INT'L
LAW 835, 838-40 (1985)).
81. Fishman & Metzger, supra note 3, at 59. "More objects from more cultures attract the atten-
tion of collectors and museums; the numbers of collectors and museums grow; their acquisition funds
increase; market price levels rise." Merryman, supra note 32, at 354-55.
82. Sayre, supra note 5. at 857.
83. Yapko, Comment, supra note 29, at 643.
84. Id at 642.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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no intention, or legislation, to protect the tribal property of American Indians."8
One commentator traced the path from Colonial American ethnocentrism to
what he called an enlightened cultural pluralism: the recognition of inherent
aesthetic value in non-white cultural property." Thus, a self-educating process
ensued as a function of archaeology and intellectual dialogue. As anthropology
and archeology emerged as scientific disciplines, preservation of non-European
based culture increased.'
2. Protective Legislation
Congress has enacted legislation which protects and preserves cultural proper-
ty in the United States.9 This legislation includes the American Antiquities
Preservation Act of 1982,92 the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of
1979,"3 the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,' the National Historic
Preservation Act of 1966,"5 the Historic Sites Act of 1936,' and the Lieber
Code of 1863."7 The protection of most of this legislation extends only to ob-
jects and structures of historic, architectural, or archaeological importance, exist-
ing on lands which the Government owns or controls, or objects and structures
which the Government has bought or received as gifts." In addition, the statutes
only protect objects created by American artists or related to American topics,
which the Government controls." Thus, examples of protected structures and
objects include the Statue of Liberty, presidential residences, and objects owned
by the Smithsonian Institution." The statutes' purposes are to conserve the
United State's national heritage, and to guarantee that the spirit and direction of
88. Id. at 643.
89. Id. at 638-56.
90. Id. at 640-41.
91. Fishman & Metzger, supra note 3, at 64.
92. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1982). The act originated in 1906: 34 Stat. 225 (1906).
93. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470ee (1982). This act limited the freedom of cultural property export for
the first time in the United States. It attempts to prohibit the export of objects illegally removed from
'public lands or Indian lands,' lands under federal ownership or protective jurisdiction. Merryman,
supra note 4, at 479 n.4 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 470ee).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., (1970).
95. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470, 470(b). 470(c)-470(n) (1970).
96. 16 U.S.C. § 461 et seq., (1988).
97. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Order
No. 100, Adjutant General's Office, Dept. of the Army, Apr. 24, 1863. The Lieber Code stated that
'by the modem usage of nations, which has now acquired tle force of law, temples of religion, pub-
lic edifices devoted to civil purposes only, monuments of art, and repositories of science, are exempt-
ed from the general operations of war.' Yapko, Comment, supra note 29, at 649.
98. Fishman & Metzger, supra note 3, at 64-65. An executive order called for an inventory sys-
tem cataloging protected cultural property, and prohibiting the sale, alteration, or transfer of such
property without the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation's consent. Fishman & Metzger .upra
note 3, at 65 (citing Exec. Order No. 11,593, 3 C.F.R. 154, 155-56 (1971)).
99. Fishman & Metzger, supra note 3, at 65.
100. Fishman & Metzger, supra note 3, at 65.
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the Nation are founded upon and reflected in its historical past.' The legisla-
tion attempts to give a sense of orientation to the American people. 2
In a related effort to preserve American cultural heritage, Congress created the
Institute of Museum Services (IMS) in 1976."0 The IMS serves as an agency
within the National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities, providing financial
assistance to American museums, for the conservation of their objects.'" In a
1976 report, the National Conservation Advisory Council stated that a significant
amount of American cultural property receives almost no care for its preserva-
tion.0 5 "This condition exists partly because of the large number of holdings
relative to limited curatorial staff, partly because of a lack of awareness of the
seriousness of the problem, and partly because of the lack of adequately trained
conservators."' 06 One commentator stated that the IMS has had a positive, but
limited impact on preservation. 7 The commentator argued that successful pres-
ervation of America's cultural heritage requires more efforts from the museum
community, as well as from the public."° Additional funding could come from
a privately funded national endowment, available to all museums."l In addi-
tion, museums could focus some of their efforts on the preservation of their
collections, as opposed to searching out new acquisitions."0
Despite its various protective statutes, the United States still does not prohibit
the export of significant cultural property owned by art dealers, museums, or
private collectors."'
F. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF REGULATION OF
CULTURAL PROPERTY EXPORTS
1. Advantages
Proponents of export regulation assert that it is desirable because it does not
exacerbate the economic inequalities between rich art market nations and poor art
source nations."' Thus, source nations with export controls can retain their cul-
101. Id. (citing National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 470(a) (1970)).
102. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 470(b) (1970)).
103. Theodore Sky, The Institute of Museum Services and the Conservation of America's Heritage,
93 DICK. L. REv. 659, 659 (1989). The IMS was created under the Museum Services Act, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 961-68 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
104. Id. at 659.
105. Id. at 660.
106. Id. (citing the NATIONAL CONSERVATION ADVISORY COUNCIL, CONSERVATION OF CULTURAL
PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES vii (1976)).
107. Id. at 683 ("The dollars that IMS can devote to conservation can in no way meet the aggre-
gate treatment and other conservation needs of the Nation. Nor were they intended to.").
108. Id. at 683-84.
109. Id. at 684.
110. Id.
S111. Fishman & Metzger, supra note 3, at 66.
112. Rafanelli, Comment, supra note 2, at 545; see supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text
(discussing market and source nations).
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tural property and enjoy the resulting benefits, such as "a strengthened national
identity, richer museums, an increase in tourism and profits from legitimate art
sales . ,,I,3
Although the United States has been traditionally considered an art market
nation, some commentators argue that it needs to regulate the export of its cul-
tural patrimony. They argue that the United States has lost some of its cultural
patrimony, and is in danger of losing more. An example of such a loss is the
sale to a European buyer of a white marble bust of Benjamin Franklin, sculpted
by a French artist, and which had been in the United States since 1785.1"
2. Disadvantages
The major argument against restricting the export of cultural property, often
held by artists and other professionals in the art and museum community, is that
culture and art belong to all of humanity and should be freely available to those
who value them most." '5 Under this view, export regulation impairs the free
exchange of cultural property, which promotes the "preservation, care, study,
exhibition, and use for the education of the greatest number of people.""' 6
Another disadvantage is the development of black markets in response to
export controls on cultural property for which there is a high demand. One com-
mentator argues that black markets occur for two reasons. First, embargoes pro-
vide no trade alternatives for buyers or sellers, and therefore embargoes encour-
age illegal trade."' Sellers can obtain high prices for the otherwise unavailable
objects, and buyers' demands intensify as it becomes more difficult to obtain cer-
tain objects legally. Second, broad export controls are administratively unenforce-
able because as restrictions become stricter it becomes more difficult to enforce
export regulations."' The process of interdicting smuggling is expensive, cum-
bersome, and inefficient."9 The administration of restrictions is also vulnerable
to corruption."'
III. ANALYSIS
This section first considers the concept of the American national heritage,
which is important to designing a cultural property export control scheme for the
United States. This Comment argues that any such scheme must be flexible
inorder to conform with the United States' general free trade stance and to avoid
adverse results, such as a black market.
113. Rafanelli, Comment, supra note 2. at 545.
114. Fishman & Metzger, supra note 3. at 57.
115. Rafanelli, Comment, supra note 2, at 544; see supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text
(discussing cultural internationalism).
116. Rafanelli, Comment, supra note 2, at 544.
117. Bator, supra note 1, at 318.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 319.
120. Id.
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A. NATIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE
An important question is, when does a cultural object become part of a
country's cultural heritage. Several factors, often in combination, determine
whether an object is significant enough to warrant strict protection as a piece of
a country's heritage or identity. The factors include the period of time the coun-
try has possessed the object; the size of a collection of objects; who owns the
cultural property; the property's accessibility to the public; and the property's
historical significance.
A clear example of a piece of the United States' cultural heritage is the Statue
of Liberty. Although it did not originate in America, it was a gift from the
French, and has been in the United States for over two hundred years. It is his-
torically important, serving as the symbol for our ethnically diverse society. The
sale and export of the statue would be unthinkable to most, if not all, Americans.
A more nebulous example is the collection of Impressionism at the Art Insti-
tute in Chicago. It is considered one of the most important collections of impres-
sionist art in the world, yet most of the pieces are by European painters. Argu-
ably, the collection, because it is identified with a well-known, oft-visited
American museum, is part of the American cultural heritage.
The concept of American cultural heritage may appear as somewhat of an
oxymoron. Because the United States is a composite of other cultures, how could
America have it's own cultural identity? Other than jazz and blues music, for
example, few artistic forms are "purely" American. But, the "melting pot" phe-
nomenon creates a cultural heritage. The unique mixture of cultures, religions,
and languages (setting aside the problems of racism and cultural conflicts) is pre-
cisely what identifies the United States. Therefore, cultural heritage does not
necessarily require cultural homogeneity. The problem with the "melting pot"
argument is that, taken to its logical extreme, the United States should prohibit
the export of almost all cultural property, since all of the pieces of American
cultural property would be needed to complete the cultural puzzle.
There are few objects as clearly part of the American cultural heritage as the
Statue of Liberty, or the Constitution. Rather, the grayer areas, exemplified by
the Art Institute example, pervade. Therefore, any proposal for cultural property
export control in the United States must consider American attitudes toward
cultural property in the United States. Thus, the scheme should recognize that
various cultures contribute to our cultural heritage, while at the same time it
should focus on saving only the most important cultural property.
One commentator has argued for the removal of cultural property from the
discourse of commodities, and for each piece's deposit with the groups from
which the property originated."' However, it is too late to discuss that idea as
a practical or realistic alternative. First, the cultural property market is en-
trenched with cultural property. Second, because the protection of individual
property rights is ingrained in our national psyche, owner's of confiscated prop-
121. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing Clemency Coggins' idea).
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erty would feel their property rights had been violated.
B. CULTURAL PROPERTY EXPORT CONTROL SCHEME
Any cultural property export control scheme in the United States must recog-
nize the existing free trade stance, exemplified in the EAA.
The ability of United States citizens to engage in international commerce is a
fundamental concern of United States policy. Exports contribute significantly to
the economic well-being of the United States .... The restriction of exports
from the United States can have serious adverse effects on the balance of pay-
ments and on domestic employment .... "
Thus, an export control scheme should not be overly restrictive, and should
attempt to avoid adverse consequences, such as black markets.12
1. Licensing
A cultural property export regulation scheme begins with an export licensing
requirement, as is found under the Export Administration Act. 4 The UNESCO
definition of cultural property would provide a useful, broad base from which to
start. 22 Items falling within the definition could then be screened through a
minimum value standard. Two authors have suggested an arbitrary minimum of
fifty thousand dollars.'26 However, the amount should reflect some debate
among knowledgeable people in the cultural property field.
2. Administration
a. Art Export Advisory Council
An administrative body would evaluate license applications. Two commenta-
tors have suggested an Art Export Advisory Council (AEAC), modeled after the
existing Export Administration Review Board under the EAA.2 7 The AEAC
would consist of art experts, historians, museum directors and curators, and non-
professionals. Procedurally, the President would give the National Endowment
for the Arts (NEA) controlling power over the AEAC.
The following criteria have been suggested for the evaluation of export licens-
es:
"1. Is the object so closely connected with American history, literature, art, sci-
ence, or cultural life that its departure would be a significant loss to the nation's
122. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401(1)-(2) (Supp. 1991).
123. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text (discussing the disadvantages of restrictive
export regulations).
124. Fishman & Metzger, supra note 3, at 72.
125. Supra, note 6.
126. Fishman & Metzger, supra note 3. at 72.
127. Id. at 72-73.
128. Id. at 72.
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cultural heritage?2. Is the object of outstanding aesthetic importance to the
understanding of a period of American art or to the work of an American art-
ist?3. Is the object particularly significant for the study of a particular branch of
American learning, art, or history?"'"
"The decision whether or not to refuse an export license on grounds of national
importance [would] depend] on how high the object stands in one or more of
[the] categories and on whether a reasonable offer to purchase can be made to
ensure its retention in this country."'" The export licensing decision must also
consider the likelihood that the object will be well-preserved, and whether it will
be accessible to the public.'
The question of accessibility must involve considerations of modem technolo-
gy. For example, art in European museums could be viewed live via satellite in
the United States. Given the state of video technology, must the object be seen in
person to be appreciated? Although a live transmission is of course more vivid
than photographs, and is a better alternative to no access at all, it is not a desir-
able alternative. Despite the visual clarity the transmission could provide, an
object can be truly experienced only in person. For example, someone can look
at a picture of Seurat's La Grande Jatte and be able to generally describe it to
someone else and to have a mental image of it. But only by looking at the real
painting in person, only feet or inches away, could that individual see the nu-
ances that each brushstroke created, and the actual texture on the canvas. Thus,
the difference between seeing an object live and seeing a representation of it,
combined with the other factors already discussed, may require the denial of an
export license.
b. Limiting Exports
One possible tool for narrowing the number of objects which are denied li-
censes is a priority list. Japan has used this system, creating a list of cultural
items which are too important to leave the country." 2 This may be too imprac-
tical because of the sheer amount of possible objects to evaluate.
Another concept, borrowed from the English export regulation system and
similar to a right of first refusal, is to allow the Government to purchase objects
for which people have applied for licenses. 3 The Government could initiate an
endowment to facilitate such purchases. Thus, the Smithsonian could, subject to
the endowment's amount, purchase objects it considered essential to the national
heritage. The endowment could also provide low-interest loans to museums for
the same purpose."3
129. Fishman & Metzger, supra note 3, at 73: see also FELDMAN & WELL, supra note 1, at 577
(providing the English Notice to Exporters).
130. FELDMAN & WEIL, supra note I, at 577 (providing the English Notice to Exporters).
131. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text (discussing preservation of cultural property).
132. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing cultural property export regulation in
Japan).
133. Fishman & Metzger, supra note 3, at 73.
134. Id.
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The endowment would not serve as a panacea, as the British experience
shows. In 1977-1978, of the twenty licenses denied in England, the country
eventually issued eight because no one offered to purchase the pieces in
England. 3 ' There simply is not enough money to guarantee the retention of ev-
ery desired piece.
c. Living Artists
A collateral but important issue is whether the export scheme should restrict
the export of living artists' work which they still own. Extending the above ideas
to the logical extreme, the export legislation would subject living artists' work to
the same criteria. However, this Comment argues against such an invasion into
that area of private ownership. In fact, it could constitute a violation of the tak-
ings clause of the Fifth Amendment."
IV. CONCLUSION
Currently, the United States places no restrictions on the export of its cultural
property. This lack of export control arguably could drain the United States of its
cultural patrimony. An examination of the United States' general export policies
shows that they originated in response to threats to the national security posed by
communist nations. Since the 1949 Export Administration Act, which gave the
President broad powers to control exports, Congress has attempted to restrict the
President's power in that area. Thus, Congress has espoused a free trade stance,
which would be inconsistent with any attempts to severely restrict cultural prop-
erty exports. Any cultural property export regulations must recognize that politi-
cal stance, and be narrowly tailored to protect only the most significant cultural
property.
135. Bator, supra note 1, at 320. "Major works have been retained: El Greco's Dream of Phillip 1I;
Rubens's The Holy Family; Titian's The Death of Actaeon (purchased by the National Gallery)... "
Bator, supra note 1, at 320.
136. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
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